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On 15 March 2012 the prime minister released the report of 
the Better Public Services advisory and governance group 
appointed in May 2011 (the report had been completed in 
November 2011 but release was delayed over the election 
period) (Better Public Services Advisory Group (BPSAG), 
2011). Public attention focused on the creation of a new 
‘business-facing’ government department, the Ministry 
of Business, Innovation and Employment, and on the ten 
expectations that collectively made up ‘a new results-driven 
focus for the public service’, to which the prime minister 
devoted his speech of 15 March 2012 (Key, 2012). Other 
initiatives, such as the pooling of justice sector budgets,1 
have attracted little comment in the media but open up 
possibilities for greater inter-agency collaboration.
In this article I comment from an 
historical perspective on three selected 
aspects of the Better Public Services report: 
coordination and a unified career public 
service; ministerial responsibility; and the 
place of the State Services Commission. 
A review of the public sector in today’s 
circumstances is welcome. But it is also 
timely to reassert the values that have 
served New Zealand well through the 
century since the Public Service Act 1912.
Why change?
In the 1980s, in the zeal of the ‘revolution’ 
that culminated in the State Sector and 
Public Finance acts, there was a frequent 
tendency to ignore the past – the ‘old’ public 
service – and where it was acknowledged 
the presumption was that it was of little 
relevance to the exciting new world of the 
‘new’ public service. Whether deliberate or 
not, such exclusion of the ‘old’ is common 
in revolutionary situations. Now, some 25 
years later, it is perhaps easier to see that 
there is continuity in the story of the New 
Zealand public service which provides 
at least part of the context in which 
current problems are being addressed and 
opportunities taken.
The report states that ‘New Zealand 
faces the most challenging international 
economic environment in generations’ 
Discussion since has tended to highlight 
two interpretations of the significance 
of the prime minister’s announcement 
and the supporting work of the advisory 
group. Some have seen the foreshadowed 
reorientation of the public service as 
signalling ‘reforms’ to be equated with 
the ‘revolution’ of the 1980s. Others have 
been more sceptical: limited departmental 
restructuring, yet another set of ‘goals’ 
and further reductions in the resources 
available were simply continuing the 
process of adjustment to the machinery 
and staffing of the public service that has 
gone on since the State Sector Act 1988 
and the Public Finance Act 1989.
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(BPSAG, 2011, p.5). Such judgements are 
legitimate matters for debate. But it is 
salutary to recall that over the past century 
New Zealand has confronted other 
severe challenges: two world wars; the 
depression of the 1930s; the deterioration 
of wool and dairy prices and the terms of 
trade in 1957–58 (followed by the ‘Black 
Budget’ and the reinstatement of import 
controls); the sharp decline of wool prices 
in 1967 (accompanied by devaluation); 
the ‘oil crises’ of the 1970s; and the 
conjunction of balance of payments and 
fiscal crises in 1984. While the reforms of 
the 1980s stand out because of their scope 
and comprehensiveness, past challenges 
also carried implications for the public 
service: for instance, in the form of pay 
cuts and the cessation of recruitment in 
1931–32, or staff ceilings and ‘sinking lids’ 
in the postwar years.
The advisory group’s observation 
that there is a need ‘to move away 
from a culture where value for money 
is a secondary consideration’ (p.6) is 
surprising. The pursuit of ‘efficiency and 
economy’ has been a statutory injunction 
to the public service since 1912, even 
though the location of responsibility 
among ministers, chief executives 
(permanent heads until 1988) and the 
State Service Commission (the Public 
Service Commission until 1962) has not 
always been clear. But it would be hard 
to find a period within the history of 
the modern New Zealand public service 
when measures to improve efficiency and 
economy were not being explored and 
promoted. In the early postwar years O 
and M (organisation and methods review), 
work study and operations research were 
favoured approaches to lifting efficiency. 
In the 1960s and 1970s financial controls 
– ‘the successive incarnations of the 
new expenditure order – PPBS, Sigma, 
COPE, CCEX, compensatory savings’2 
(McKinnon, 2003, p.263) – were at the 
forefront of the campaign for greater 
efficiency and economy.
The history of the New Zealand 
public service has been one of continuing 
aspiration towards ‘better public services’ 
while adjusting to the challenges posed to 
successive governments by world events. 
Standing out from this evolutionary 
process have been two major episodes. 
The first was the royal commission on the 
state services which reported in 1962 (the 
McCarthy Commission). The initiative 
for the establishment of the McCarthy 
Commission came largely from the public 
service and particularly the Institute of 
Public Administration (see Martin, 2006, 
pp.62-8). The supporting rationale was 
largely that it was 50 years since the Hunt 
Commission and the 1912 act, and the 
context within which the public service 
operated was very different. But this was 
not an occasion for a radical change of 
direction. In the event, the impact of the 
State Services Act 1962 and associated 
‘reforms’ was probably much less than 
those who had sought a considered review 
of the machinery of government and 
staffing issues hoped for or expected.
The second, and much more far-
reaching, interruption to the evolutionary 
path of public service development was 
the ‘revolution’ of the 1980s. There was 
a questioning of the whole framework 
within which the public service operated. 
In the words of Geoffrey Palmer 
(speaking in particular about large 
trading departments): 
The first thought was that large 
bureaucracies were unmanageable, that 
they were not responsive, that they were 
not flexible and that they tended to be 
inefficient as well. We found as a new 
government that we weren’t actually in 
control of them in any real sense, and 
that came as somewhat of a surprise, 
because as people who believed in the 
orthodox theory of the Westminster 
system we were confronted at once 
with the reality that it does not work. 
(Palmer, 1988, pp.1, 2)
The result was the all-embracing 
reforms of the State Sector Act 1988 and 
the Public Finance Act 1989. Two decades 
after these reforms were put in place, the 
Better Public Services Advisory Group 
defines ‘the greatest challenge facing the 
state services [as] to gain more traction on 
achieving results: the complex and long 
term issues that cross agency boundaries’ 
(BPSAG, 2011, p.23). Cited examples 
of the societal results to be prioritised 
are found in ‘law and order’, welfare 
numbers, educational underperformance, 
infant mortality and low productivity 
growth (p.15). The ‘10 challenging results’ 
announced by the prime minister and 
deputy prime minister3 cover similar 
ground. Few would challenge the 
ministers’ expectations. The characteristic 
that sets them apart from other objective-
setting exercises over the past 40 years is 
their quantification. There is an echo of 
the 1980s mantra: ‘If you can’t measure 
it, you can’t manage it.’ The danger is 
that less-quantifiable values are neglected 
(see, for example, the current controversy 
surrounding the culture of the ACC).
Nonetheless, the advisory group 
makes a strong case for improvements in 
the state services, including ways in which 
to ‘manage the state agencies that provide 
or fund services less as a collection of 
individual agencies, in pursuit of their 
own singular objectives, and more as a 
system that is focused on the results that 
will have the biggest positive impact on 
New Zealanders’ lives’ (ibid., p.5).
Such a laudable proposition bears a 
close relationship to a problem that has 
always troubled governments – that of 
coordination across the diverse range of 
entities that make up the state sector.
coordination 
Government agencies (broadly defined) 
are ‘instruments of the Crown’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2008, p.36).4 The notion of 
‘the Crown’ encapsulates the principal 
The history of the New Zealand public service 
has been one of continuing aspiration towards 
‘better public services’ while adjusting to the 
challenges posed to successive governments by 
world events. 
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characteristics of the public service as a 
central institution of the New Zealand 
constitution: continuity and ‘indivisibi-
lity’.5 Commitments made by government 
agencies retain their validity over time 
until formally disowned, irrespective of 
changes at the political level. The centrality 
to a system of democratic governance of 
this characteristic assigns a high value to 
the capacity for institutional memory that 
marks an effective public service. 
Similarly, an agency does not act alone. 
In all that it does it acts in the name of 
‘the government’ or formally ‘the Crown’. 
There is a presumption that agencies will 
communicate and exchange information 
and views in promoting and executing 
the wishes of the government – that their 
actions (including advice to ministers) 
will be coordinated. But deficiencies 
in coordination have been a perennial 
issue. As long ago as 1940 Leicester Webb 
was observing that ‘[c]oordination to 
prevent duplication of work and to 
secure the harmonious participation 
of several departments in the one 
administrative process is less complete’ 
(than ‘coordination in the interests of 
economy and uniformity’) (Webb, 1940, 
p.98). Leslie Lipson in 1948 commented 
that the existing bureaucratic structure 
‘[a]ll too often … results in the problems 
being treated as separate ones, in the lack 
of coordinated planning, and in acute 
clashes of policy and jurisdiction among 
the agencies concerned’ (Lipson, 1948, 
p.382). And as I write the media continue 
to identify problems of coordination. 
An article in the New Zealand Herald 
about the management of New Zealand’s 
exclusive economic zone and continental 
shelf speaks of ‘a Balkanised bureaucracy 
with limited responsibilities for bits of 
the system but with inevitably divergent 
cultures’ (Fallow, 2012).
The prescription for such diagnoses 
has traditionally been a reordering of 
the organisational structure of the state 
services. And a variant of that approach 
is again proposed by the advisory group. 
Sixteen years ago Jonathan Boston 
observed that ‘[d]espite continuing 
debate over the best way of organizing 
public bureaucracies, no scholarly 
consensus has emerged on many of 
the fundamental issues of institutional 
design’ (Boston, 1996, p.70). One of the 
undeniable conclusions from experience 
over two decades since is that there is no 
‘one size fits all’ pattern for the machinery 
of government. 
The advisory group’s assessment is 
that the New Zealand public service 
now comprises ‘a large number of small 
focused agencies, with roles that can 
overlap or duplicate each other’ and with 
‘a lack of economies of scale’. Equally, the 
cross-cutting nature of the major issues 
confronting the government ‘need[s] 
action across agency boundaries, and 
currently this action takes too long’ 
(BPSAG, 2011, p.20). Underpinning these 
judgements is the group’s view that one of 
the ‘defining characteristics of the current 
New Zealand public management system 
is how it concentrates decision-rights and 
accountabilities with the chief executives’.
These arrangements, it continues, 
‘support a strong ability to deliver against 
the “vertical” commitments within a 
single agency but have constrained 
“horizontal” leadership – within sectors, 
across functional areas and for the system 
as a whole’. The group reports a ‘common 
belief ’ among chief executives ‘that our 
efforts are spread too thin, are not well 
coordinated and would benefit from a 
sharper focus on bigger challenges that 
are likely to make a bigger difference’ 
(pp.21, 29).
The advisory group considers a range 
of options for the change and adaptation 
of the machinery of government. It 
‘suggests [that] a broader spectrum of 
organisational arrangements is needed 
than is currently available’: ‘Between 
the current options of loose agency 
groupings and structural change, we 
propose a broader menu’ (ibid., p.26). 
Specifically, the group presents these 
broad options on a range from ‘informal’ 
to ‘formal’: loose agency groupings; 
mandated sector; joint ventures; semi-
structured executive agency model; and 
fully-integrated departmental model. 
Leaving aside ‘problematic’ loose agency 
groupings and the option of moving to 
larger departments, ‘which is often not 
appropriate’, the group discusses in more 
detail the options of:
(a) ‘hard-’ or ‘soft-wired’ sector boards 
which would have oversight across 
the agencies operating in a prescribed 
sector, whether by mutual consent or 
through more formal arrangements 
for financial accountability and 
reporting;
(b) joint ventures as a way of organising 
(and dedicating resources 
to) activities which involve a 
‘significant, but not dominant’ 
element of departments’ (and 
community groups’) responsibilities, 
incorporating both policy and 
operational capability. Scope for 
such arrangements might lie in such 
natural resource activities as the 
availability of fresh water and the 
value of coastal and marine areas; 
the improvement of services for 
at-risk children aged 0–6 and in the 
contribution and achievement of 
young people; skills in demand by 
business, and labour productivity 
growth;
(c) executive agencies – ‘a new 
organisational form – to help avoid 
having either few large, multi-
functional departments or many 
small agencies’ – accountable for 
their own operational responsibilities 
but working to strategy, policy and 
funding arrangements determined 
by a lead agency. (Such agencies 
would be more embedded in the core 
public service than Crown entities.) 
... the New Zealand public service now comprises  
‘a large number of small focused agencies, with  
roles that can overlap or duplicate each other’  
and with ‘a lack of economies of scale’.
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Advantages could be gained, the 
group suggests, from the creation 
of a single skills and education 
policy hub and the conversion of 
the operational arms of departments 
into agencies focused on delivery in 
such areas as immigration and the 
management of schools.
The major decision already announced 
by the government is the formation on 
1 July 2012 of a new ‘single, dedicated, 
business-facing government department’: 
the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment, integrating the functions 
of Economic Development, Labour, 
Science and Innovation, and Building 
and Housing. The case for such a major 
restructuring is worthy of an analytical 
study of its own – and we must assume 
that this has been done under the label 
of ‘due diligence’ (Joyce and Coleman, 
2012) – but it is interesting to note that 
the advisory group warns against ‘a sharp 
reduction of agencies across the board … 
[r]estructuring is expensive and disruptive 
and can be counter-productive, at least in 
the short term’ (BPSAG, 2011, p.20). And 
the prime minister has said that ‘there 
is a high hurdle for structural change 
in the public sector’ (Key, 2012).6 In the 
case of the new ministry there are many 
questions to be asked. What logic lies 
behind the ‘business-facing’ claim? What 
shift is taking place in the dynamics of 
government? And when and how can 
the success or otherwise of this major 
dislocation be judged?
This caution is strongly supported by 
the hard-hitting critique of Derek Gill 
and Richard Norman (2011). They have no 
doubt about the motivation behind the 
‘addiction’ to restructuring over the past 
two decades. It is ‘a result of the “freedom 
to manage” formula adopted in the late 
1980s to break up a unified and “career-for-
life” bureaucracy that was seen to respond 
too slowly to the economic crises of the 
1980s’ (Gill and Norman, 2011, p.262, 
emphasis added). Gill and Norman, after 
substantial research, are also forthright 
in their conclusion that ‘in too many 
cases the result is the loss of institutional 
capacity, and the undermining of the 
ability of public organisations to work 
effectively on cross-cutting issues’ (ibid., 
p.278). 
There can be no return to the unified, 
career, ‘old’ public service. But it is worthy 
of note that, historically, job stability and 
a very real awareness of being employed 
in the public service – as well as a 
department – facilitated working across 
departmental boundaries. Relationships 
born in the early years of a career were 
built on as people moved through the 
ranks towards senior managerial positions. 
In my own experience this factor was 
effectively demonstrated in the working 
of the Officials Economic Committee 
which coordinated economic advice from 
the 1950s to the 1970s. (Economic matters 
preoccupied ministerial attention at this 
time; similar coordinating arrangements 
for social policy would have been 
advantageous.) The Better Public Services 
report is encouragingly strong on the 
value of cross-agency collaboration. In 
addition to structural or procedural 
innovations, however, history suggests 
that after a period during which ‘silo’ has 
been an overworked cliché there is now 
a need for a deliberate nurturing of the 
notion of ‘the Crown’ and the public 
service, and all that implies for day-to-
day ways of working in agencies. 
 Equally important in the ‘old’ public 
service was the accumulation of the 
aforementioned ‘institutional memory’ – 
familiarity with departmental legislation 
and precedent, that essential component 
of continuity.7 The disrupted careers and 
short-term appointments that characterise 
restructuring cut across the objective of 
effective inter-agency coordination. All 
too frequently the claim is being made 
that there is a lack of expertise and 
experience – of institutional memory – 
in departments. As I write this issue is 
at the forefront of public discussion of 
adventure tourism and safety in mines. 
Too little credit has been given to the 
hardened ‘Lambton Quay warriors’ 
who over the years built up invaluable 
knowledge of departmental legislation, 
the relationships so significant within a 
sector, and the context in which policies 
were formed. 
Several motivations can lie behind 
restructuring the machinery of 
government. Changes may be initiated for 
party political reasons (and there has been 
some media speculation that the creation 
of the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment reflects and strengthens 
the position of Steven Joyce within the 
Cabinet).8 But the two interrelated themes 
of the Better Public Services report are 
greater efficiency – value-for-money – 
and ‘better results for New Zealanders’. 
By reducing duplication and through 
consolidation of activity, it is argued, costs 
can be reduced. Economies of scale could 
be realised by consolidating activities 
with ‘a common function, value chain or 
customer’. Such savings might be found in 
‘back-office functions’ – such as the central 
agency collaboration through the Central 
Agencies Shared Services – or in reducing 
the ‘churn’ of policy advice (BPSAG, 
2011, pp.11, 10, 42).  Drawing on the Scott 
report (Review of Expenditure on Policy 
Advice, 2010) on the policy process, the 
group believes that better management 
of policy advice across the public service, 
including establishing ‘cross-agency policy 
hubs’, could result in major cost savings: 
an ‘attainable medium-term goal could 
be a 20% saving (or reduction in cost 
pressures) over five years’ (p.42).
The group’s emphasis on ‘cross-
agency’ coordination is correctly 
focused and its remedial approach has 
some attraction, given that it carefully 
stresses that ‘[d]etermining the right 
organizational form needs to take account 
of factors such as scope of activities, 
critical mass and economies of scale 
as well as the impact on results’ (ibid. 
p.27). Nonetheless, three warning flags 
are hoisted here: first, the demonstrated 
Equally important in the ‘old’ public service was 
the accumulation of the ... ‘institutional memory’ ... 
that essential component of continuity.
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While the ‘decoupling’ of ‘outputs’ and ‘outcomes’ 
seemed at one level to codify the conventional 
distinction between ‘policy’ and ‘administration’, 
it did not affect the responsibility of ministers to 
answer for the activities of their departments.
downside of restructuring as discussed 
above; secondly, the need for the public 
service leadership – notably the State 
Services Commission (to which I return 
below) – to embark on a programme 
that overtly promotes and encourages a 
sense of the unity of the public service 
and the associated virtue of ‘institutional 
memory’. Thirdly, the organisational 
changes under consideration add new 
dimensions to what seem to me to be 
unsatisfactory features of arrangements 
for accountability and responsibility in 
New Zealand government.
accountability and responsibility
I would not disagree with the observation 
of Jonathan Boston and Derek Gill that ‘by 
international standards, New Zealand has 
long enjoyed a high degree of government 
accountability’(Boston and Gill, 2011, 
p.244). Rightly, they also note that ‘while 
formal accountability arrangements 
matter … they are not the only thing that 
matters’; and they urge ‘a new openness to 
collaborative arrangements and a broad 
conception of accountability’ (ibid., 
pp.246, 247). My concern is with the 
status of what remains, in my view, the 
cornerstone of the New Zealand variant 
of the Westminster system: the vicarious 
responsibility of ministers for the actions 
of the public service. 
K.J. Scott 50 years ago discussed 
ministerial responsibility for departmental 
actions in these terms:
Where the actions of departmental 
officers have been done on the 
minister’s bidding, the minister 
is primarily as well as vicariously 
responsible. Where they have not 
been done on the minister’s bidding, 
the minister’s responsibility is 
vicarious only. In practice a minister 
always admits that he is responsible 
for the actions of his subordinates 
in the sense of being accountable for 
them. (Scott, 1962, p.125)
That is how the doctrine was generally 
understood and, albeit with reluctance at 
times, practised by ministers and public 
servants until the 1980s. Controversy 
attended some much-cited cases: for 
example, Robert Semple (minister of 
works) and the 1944 Fordell and Turakina 
tunnels. And the situation was often 
confused by a predictable but misplaced 
focus on whether or not the minister 
should resign. That diverted attention 
from the three components of the 
doctrine: first, that the minister should, 
desirably in Parliament, ‘front up’ by 
acknowledging the error or fault of the 
department (accountability); secondly, by 
initiating an enquiry into the situation; 
and thirdly, by assuring citizens that 
appropriate action, if necessary, was being 
taken to correct the error or remedy the 
fault (taking responsibility).
By 1987 Geoffrey Palmer was striking 
off in a new direction, claiming that the 
scope of the doctrine was ‘unreasonably 
and impractically wide … it is unrealistic 
to say that [ministers] must take the rap for 
things they do not know about and did not 
authorize’ (Palmer, 1987, p.56). The system 
put in place by the State Sector Act 1988 
and the Public Finance Act 1989 reflected 
this approach. Arrangements based upon 
the distinction between ‘outputs’ and 
‘outcomes’ aligned respectively with chief 
executives and ministers and related by 
contractual arrangements altered the 
location of accountability. Roger Douglas 
put it bluntly in the 1988 Budget: ‘We 
[ministers] are disengaging from day-to-
day departmental decision-making … the 
Government is freed from the distractions 
of daily management decisions and can 
concentrate instead on broad policy 
directions and initiatives.’
In the light of these ministerial 
pronouncements it is important to 
distinguish between constitutional 
responsibility and ministerial engagement 
with the management of departments. 
They are quite separate questions. 
While the ‘decoupling’ of ‘outputs’ and 
‘outcomes’ seemed at one level to codify 
the conventional distinction between 
‘policy’ and ‘administration’, it did not 
affect the responsibility of ministers 
to answer for the activities of their 
departments. Twenty years later the 
Cabinet manual is quite clear:
Ministers decide both the direction 
and the priorities for their 
departments. They should not 
be involved in their departments’ 
day-to-day operations. In general 
terms, Ministers are responsible 
for determining and promoting 
policy, defending policy decisions, 
and answering in the House on 
both policy and operational matters. 
(Cabinet Office, 2008, para 3.5, 
emphasis added)
Over the past 25 years the constitutional 
question of responsibility has tended 
to be subsumed in the concentration 
on improved performance by public 
agencies. A consequence has been a 
temptation for ministers, uncomfortable 
with the all-embracing scope of vicarious 
responsibility, to assign responsibility for 
‘managerial’ matters to chief executives; 
and for officials to be expected to 
‘front up’ for matters which, before ‘the 
revolution’, would have been accepted as 
the responsibility of ministers.9 As the 
chief ombudsman observed as early as 
1990, ‘Given the accountability structure 
for senior officials in relation to outputs 
… ministers now have every opportunity 
if they wish to take it to transfer 
accountability for outputs to officials’ 
(Robertson, 1990, p.9, emphasis added). 
That has indeed been so in a number 
of controversial cases (and no doubt 
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on many issues that have attracted less 
attention): e.g., blood products in 1992 
(Martin, 1994, p.50), the Tourism Board 
in the late 1990s (Controller and Auditor-
General, 1999), and, most recently, the 
‘modernisation’ of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
In a provocative and insightful essay, 
Di Francesco and Eppel discuss what they 
call ‘the public management heresy’: ‘the 
seemingly absent role of ministers within 
public management systems’. As they 
read the intentions of the 1980s reforms, 
‘[r]ather than detaching ministers from 
departmental work, these practices 
actually attach greater importance to the 
“managerial” orientation of ministers’ 
roles’ (Di Francesco and Eppel, 2011, 
p.124). The extent to which the executive 
or managerial role of ministers was 
an integral part of the ‘revolution’ is 
debatable: remember the cry ‘let the 
managers manage’? Were ministers 
to be among the managers? Or, less 
dramatically, was the emphasis to be 
on an expectation that ministers would 
in future play a more positive role in 
directing their departments and holding 
them to the delivery of the ‘outputs’ that 
the minister had agreed to purchase. The 
latter is more in line with my recollection; 
and Di Francesco and Eppel acknowledge 
that, in practice, ministers, as a general 
rule, have not conformed to the ‘enduring 
presumption of a managerial role for 
responsible ministers’ (ibid., p.135).
At the risk of the charge of 
‘antiquarianism’ I suggest that there is 
still relevance in the metaphor employed 
by Tom Shand 60 years ago:
The ideal relationship of Minister 
and departmental head is not unlike 
that of Siamese twins who move, 
who stand or fall together. The one 
looks out principally upon the world 
at large, the other looks back upon 
the department which together they 
must lead. (Shand, 1959, p.67)
Historically, effective relationships 
between ministers and the ‘leaders’ of 
departments have been built on mutual 
acceptance of the inextricably close links 
coupled with a focus on their respective 
environments; and the complementary 
exercise of their own tailored capabilities 
and skills, political and administrative 
respectively. Such a relationship is 
consistent with the constitutional 
convention of vicarious ministerial 
responsibility.
Whether or not ministers should 
be more actively involved in the 
management of their departments, as Di 
Francesco and Eppel suggest, there is a 
strong democratic argument for greater 
attention to be paid to the constitutional 
responsibility of ministers. In this context 
the attitude of the present speaker of the 
House in requiring ministers to answer 
questions is welcome.
While pursuing the wholly admirable 
objective of greater collaboration across 
agencies, the Better Public Services report 
proposes new arrangements for leadership 
in sectors that are ‘founded on a shift 
in the public management model from 
decision-rights usually at agency level to 
more cases where decision-rights are at 
sector or at system level’ (BPSAG, 2011, 
p.47). Specifically, the group recommends 
that the State Sector Act 1988 should be 
changed to ‘rebalance the accountability 
of public service chief executives more 
towards the delivery of better results and 
value-for-money, including requirements 
to collaborate where necessary, and away 
from the independent management and 
operation of departments’ (ibid., p.53). 
Parallel changes in the Public Finance Act 
1989 would also be required.
The Better Public Services report does 
acknowledge that increased cross-sector 
linkages ‘will rely heavily on the goodwill 
of chief executives and on securing 
alignment of ministerial interests’ (p.32). 
But, not surprisingly, the group does not 
discuss the way in which the proposed 
movement away from the hierarchical 
and contractual accountability regime 
that has been in place since the late 1980s 
will affect ministerial responsibility, 
quite apart from implications for 
the day-to-day working relationships 
among ministers and senior officials. As 
discussed earlier, the Westminster system 
assumed a partnership or ‘Siamese 
twins’ working relationship between 
ministers and departmental heads within 
a constitutional framework that formally 
identified responsibility. This became 
blurred after the State Sector Act. Now, 
with changes contemplated to better 
focus the resources of the public service 
on the ‘big issues’, there is the potential to 
further dilute the convention of vicarious 
ministerial responsibility. For example, 
how does the appointment10 of a ‘lead 
CEO’ to be accountable for achieving the 
new targets set by ministers affect lines 
of accountability for the several agencies 
involved? (For a perceptive in-depth 
discussion of the accountability issues 
involved in joint working, see Boston and 
Gill, 2011.)
It is not to downplay the search for a 
better-performing public service to seek 
to redirect attention to the constitutional 
issue of ministerial responsibility. A 
Canadian scholar has neatly captured the 
concern: 
In retaining responsibility for 
even what may seem minor and 
routine matters of administration, 
accepted by all as the work of civil 
servants, the doctrine [of ministerial 
responsibility] also retains the 
capacity for a direct government 
response to a public need of any 
scope. Thus the doctrine offers 
democratic control over bureaucratic 
... the Westminster system assumed a partnership 
or ‘Siamese twins’ working relationship between 
ministers and departmental heads within a 
constitutional framework that formally identified 
responsibility.
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administration past and future. 
(Sutherland, 1991, p.100)
The reluctance of an advisory group 
including senior officials to address the 
place of ‘ministerial responsibility’ is 
understandable. But it would be desirable 
for the topic to receive attention: perhaps 
the Institute for Governance and Policy 
Studies could convene a broadly-based 
round table (see James, 2002, for a 
previous exercise), or the constitutional 
review now getting under way could 
include within its deliberations the 
location of responsibility for executive 
acts.                          
The place of the SSc
A reduction in the service-wide authority 
and influence of the State Services 
Commission was an overt intention of 
the State Sector Act 1988. Most obvious 
was the devolution of the employer role 
to chief executives. Despite the influence 
associated with the employment of chief 
executives and the achievements of 
successive commissioners in such areas 
as ethical codes, performance and service 
leadership, the status, both statutory and 
in practice, of the commission in 2012 is 
much diminished from its dominant role 
across the service before 1988.
To an outsider, given speculation 
over the last few years about the demise 
of the commission a surprising – but 
welcome – feature of the advisory 
group’s report is the proposal that the 
State Services Commissioner should 
be formally designated as the ‘Head of 
State Services’. The new mandate would 
hold the Commissioner ‘accountable for 
overall performance of the state services 
and empowered to appoint sector 
heads; determine functional system-
wide leadership roles and appoint chief 
executives into these roles; and deploy 
chief executives and second and third 
tier leaders to critical roles across the 
system’ (BPSAG, 2011, p.53). Again, as 
with the appointment of ‘lead CEOs’ to 
be accountable for the achievement of 
cross-agency targets, empowering the 
commissioner to intervene at the ‘second 
and third tier’ in departments has, on 
the face of it, the potential for further 
confusing lines of accountability.
The rationale for this significant 
move away from current arrangements 
– where public sector leadership is ‘held 
loosely and somewhat jointly between 
the three central agencies’ – is that one 
agency can be held to account for overall 
performance of the state sector, although 
the Treasury and the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet will 
continue to have crucial functions and 
work closely with the commission. That 
does not, however, justify the advisory 
group’s suggestion that ‘it is worth 
considering merging the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet with the 
State Services Commission in time’ (ibid., 
p.51, emphasis added). To do so would be 
a retrograde step.
A defining role of the State Services 
Commission (and its predecessors) 
from 1912 to 1988 was that it acted as a 
buffer between ministers and the non-
partisan public service. Dignified with 
appointment by the governor-general and 
enjoying statutory independence,11 the 
Commission in matters other than finance 
was clearly primus inter pares among 
departmental heads. The Commission’s 
powers were wide – Lipson (1948, p.439) 
quotes a Commissioner commenting 
‘too wide’ – and were exercised with an 
appreciation of the need to retain the 
confidence of the government of the day. 
But when departmental heads were having 
differences with ministers the intervention 
of the SSC was a means of maintaining 
in working order the relationships at the 
centre of government. Underpinning the 
Commission’s authority was its statutory 
independence. The Commission also has 
important leadership roles, certainly no 
less important than in the past, in setting 
minimum standards of integrity and 
conduct (State Sector Act 1988, s.57) and 
to provide and maintain for the public 
service ‘persons who have the ability to 
manage at the most senior level’.12
The Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, effectively created in 1975, 
has been described as ‘the constitutional 
and institutional glue’ of the government. 
It carries no independence (except in 
respect of staff matters): it is essentially 
‘political’ (albeit not partisan) in its crucial 
primary function of assisting the prime 
minister to guide and coordinate the 
business of the government in office. For a 
comparative discussion of ‘the increasing 
concentration of power in the office of 
the prime minister [which] has become a 
defining feature in Australia, Britain and 
Canada’ see Aucoin (2012): his account 
of the staffing of the top positions in the 
public service by the prime minister in 
Australia, Britain and Canada – ‘a serious 
exception to the normative structure 
of a nonpartisan public service’– is a 
cautionary tale (Aucoin, 2012, pp.184, 191). 
The ‘checks and balances’ required in a 
central agency arrangement built around 
the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, Treasury and the SSC have 
served New Zealand well and should be 
maintained.
Given the understandable current 
preoccupation with ‘more from less’, the 
case for a respected stand-alone agency 
providing long-term leadership in service-
wide human resources and ethical issues 
is strengthened not weakened.
conclusion
The advisory group has opened up new 
directions for change in the state sector by 
proposing to extend initiatives already at 
play in some areas. Its recommendations 
are more far-reaching than has been 
The ‘checks and balances’ required in a central 
agency arrangement built around the Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury and the 
SSC have served New Zealand well and should be 
maintained.
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discussed in this essay: for instance, in the 
discussion of opportunities for the use of 
information technology. The theme that 
runs through the report is the need to 
bring to bear on the ‘big issues’ confronting 
New Zealand the resources that are found 
in different agencies across the state 
sector. Collaboration by various means is 
proposed. Successful implementation of 
these proposed measures aims to overcome 
failings long identified in the ‘vertical’ 
accountability structures inaugurated by 
the reforms of the late 1980s. The virtue of 
unity in the name of the Crown will again 
be acknowledged.
Within a framework that is built on 
the relevance of history, the purpose 
of this article has been: to caution 
against major structural change (and 
the attendant disruption and threat to 
‘institutional memory’); to question the 
clarity of lines of accountability in some 
of the arrangements now proposed; to 
urge that renewed attention be directed 
towards the importance of the convention 
of vicarious ministerial responsibility; 
and to assert the virtues of a separate 
dedicated central personnel agency – not 
least in taking the lead in encouraging a 
sense of the unity of the public service as 
an institution at the centre of the New 
Zealand constitution.
1 The minister of justice announced on 24 May the 
establishment of a Justice Sector Fund, allowing the justice 
agencies – Corrections, Courts, Justice, Police and the 
Serious Fraud Office – to share savings.
2 PPBS: planning, programming, budgeting system; Sigma: 
system of integrated government management accounting; 
COPE: Committee of Officials on Public Expenditure (group 
of permanent heads who, with the Treasury head as 
chair, reviewed votes prior to the Budget); CCEX: Cabinet 
Committee on Expenditure; ‘compensatory savings’: all new 
policies had to be funded from savings elsewhere in the Vote.
3 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-sets-public-
sector-5-year-targets.
4 Paragraph 3.3 of the manual at the same page defines the 
organisations that constitute the ‘state services’.
5 ‘The indivisibility of the Crown’ features in discussions of the 
‘composite’ Crown in relation to the emergence of nations 
within the Commonwealth (see Joseph, 1993, p.492). As 
defined in the Public Finance Act 1989 (s.2), the Crown is 
‘any department or instrument of the government, or any 
branch or division thereof’’.
6 It should be noted that the National-led government in its 
first term incorporated the National Library and Archives 
New Zealand into the Department of Internal Affairs, brought 
the Ministry of Fisheries into the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry (now the Ministry for Primary Industries) 
and merged the Foundation and Ministry of Research, 
Science and Technology into a new Ministry of Science and 
Innovation.
7 The costs of restructuring, albeit within one department, in 
terms of institutional memory and continuity have been to 
the fore in current discussion of change in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade.
8 For an interesting commentary on machinery of government 
changes in the United Kingdom during the Blair regime, see 
Heppell, 2011). 
9 It is instructive that the State Services Commission website 
(in 2002) lists among the factors causing ‘friction’ ‘increased 
exposure of public servants to criticism (including public 
criticism from Ministers and politicians) and reduced 
anonymity’ and ‘increased pressures to advocate and explain 
on behalf of Ministers’. A decade later the same observations 
are frequently made.
10 See SSC website, http://www.ssc.govt.nz/bps-results-for-
nzers, 25 June 2012.
11 The commissioner’s independence is preserved in the current 
legislation, with the significant exception of chief executive 
appointments (State Sector Act 1988, s.5).
12 The language is taken from the revoked section 46 of the 
1988 act relating to the Senior Executive Service; while the 
SES was short-lived the commission’s role remains. Without 
any reflection on the individuals concerned, the recent 
appointments of the heads of Treasury, Health, Education 
and Work and Income from overseas at the very least raises 
questions about the efficacy of succession planning.
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